When coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents' non-best response behavior, we show that the Egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm. Without intentional bias, a new solution, the Logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm. These results contrast with results under non-payo↵ dependent deviations from best response behavior, where it has previously been shown that the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms. We complement the theory with experiments on human subjects, results of which suggest that non-best response play is payo↵ dependent and displays intentional bias. This suggests the Egalitarian solution as the most likely candidate for a long run bargaining norm.
Introduction
Consider a two player coordination game with zero-payo↵s for miscoordination (contract games, Young, 1998a) and with payo↵s on the main diagonal that correspond to points on the e cient frontier of a convex bargaining set. A bargaining solution is a function that maps any given bargaining set to a payo↵ vector within the set (see Nash, 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) . 1 In his paper, 'Conventional Contracts', Young (1998a) showed that if populations of agents play such a game, usually updating their strategies according to a best response rule, but occasionally making a deviation 2 and playing something other than a best response, then the long run social norm that emerges approximates the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution. Subsequently, Naidu, Hwang and Bowles (2010) showed that if deviations are intentional so that an agent who deviates always demands more than the best response, never less, then the Nash (1950) bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm. Newton (2012a) showed that the Nash bargaining solution also emerges when the choice rule includes some degree of collective agency -joint decision making by pairs of agents. The deviations in the cited works are uniform -all possible deviations are equally likely. However, there is another commonly used model of perturbed best response, the logit choice rule. 3 Under logit choice, deviations which incur a higher payo↵ loss for the agent making them are less likely to be made. The recent approximation results of Hwang and Newton (2017) allow us to solve the problem of conventional contracts under logit choice.
It is shown that if the logit choice rule is used with intentional deviations, then the Egalitarian bargaining solution (Kalai, 1977) emerges as the long run social norm. Justifications of Egalitarianism have usually assumed some symmetry in the problem faced (Alexander and Skyrms, 1999) or invoked ex-ante symmetry of players with respect to their position in the game (Binmore, 1998 (Binmore, , 2005 . One contribution of the current paper is to give a model of adaptive behavior that leads to the Egalitarian solution without any symmetry assumptions beyond those on population size and uniformity in matching.
Furthermore, we introduce a new bargaining solution, the Logit bargaining solution, that 1 In the words of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) , 'A solution to the bargaining problem is a function f : U ! R 2 such that f (a, S) 2 S.' In their notation, U is the set of pairs (a, S), in which S is a bargaining set and a is a disagreement point. 2 Deviations are also referred to in the literature as 'errors', 'mistakes', 'mutations' and 'idiosyncratic shocks'. 3 The logit choice rule derives from the Boltzman distribution from statistical mechanics. This was later adapted to regression analysis by Cox (1958) and given a random utility interpretation by Block and Marschak (1959) . Blume (1993) then used it in modeling repeated interactions over the long run, as it is used in the current paper.
Unintentional Intentional
Uniform Kalai-Smorodinsky Young (1998a) Nash bargaining Naidu et al. (2010) Logit Logit bargaining This paper Egalitarian This paper Table 1 : Long run bargaining norms by deviation process. Each bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm under the corresponding behavioral rule and without reference to any appealing ex-post properties that the solution might have.
maximizes an adjusted Nash product, but, in the spirit of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, is influenced by the best possible payo↵s for the players. Unlike the other solutions, the Logit bargaining solution is not designed to satisfy any particular set of appealing properties, but is instead the solution that emerges when agents in populations follow a given behavioral rule, the logit choice rule. This highlights an important di↵erence between the traditional approach to bargaining solutions and the evolutionary approach. The traditional approach seeks to construct bargaining solutions with appealing properties and treats these properties as axiomatic. The evolutionary approach takes the behavioral process as axiomatic and sees what bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms of such processes. Given this, it is remarkable that three of the processes in Table 1 lead to solutions already known to the literature. In this sense, perhaps the fourth sibling of this family, the Logit bargaining solution, provides a cautionary tale, for although it emerges from one of the simplest and most common choice rules in the social sciences, it displays a quirky nonmonotonicity in comparison to the other solutions. This nonmonotonicity can be clearly and intuitively explained with reference to the underlying behavioral process, a good example of how a complex social norm can be generated by simple behavior.
Of course, the importance of the implications of any behavioral rule rests to some extent on its empirical validity. To begin to address such questions we report the results of experiments conducted to test deviation behavior in the context of the model of the paper. We find evidence in favour of intentional bias and payo↵ dependence in non-best response play. While the constraints of time mean that we cannot test the long run behavior of the empirical process, these results, together with the theoretical results summarized in Table  1 , suggest the Egalitarian solution as the most likely of our four candidates for a long run bargaining norm. Importantly, our design gives subjects no information about the payo↵s that can be attained by their potential opponents, thereby ensuring that neither pre-existing norms of surplus division nor other-regarding preferences can play a role in strategy choice.
Related literature
This study is part of a literature that studies connections between evolutionary game theory and cooperative game theory. This literature has been called the Evolutionary Nash
Program (see Newton, 2018, Section 6 , for a survey), emphasizing the parallel with the original Nash Program that studies connections between noncooperative game theory and cooperative game theory (see, e.g. Nash, 1953) . In addition to the contract games considered in the current paper, another well-developed strand of this literature concerns long run norms in Nash demand games (Nash, 1953) , where, in contrast to the coordination games considered here, players can obtain positive payo↵s from imperfect coordination. 4 Compared to contract games, Nash demand games have a less severe penalty for miscoordination that involves asking for too little. This creates a bias towards transitions in which best responding players lower their demands, similar to the transitions under intentional deviations in the current paper (see Table 3 ). 5 In line with this intuition, Young (1993b) shows that the Nash bargaining solution emerges under uniform-unintentional deviations. Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2017) show that this is also true for uniform-intentional deviations. To solve the problem for logit deviations, Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2017) extend the results of Hwang and Newton (2017) on most probable transition paths under logit choice. They use these results to show that, under logit-unintentional deviations, the Nash bargaining solution emerges, and that, under logit-intentional deviations, a new solution emerges that is more equal than the Nash bargaining solution. For generalized Nash demand games with more than two players and payo↵ structures given by characteristic functions similar to those of cooperative games, Agastya (1999) and Newton (2012b) , the latter featuring collective agency, find selection for minmax and maxmin (Rawlsian) solutions respectively under uniform-unintentional deviations.
Another strand of the literature concerns selection in matching environments with either non-transferable utility (Newton and Sawa, 2015) or transferable utility (Nax and Pradelski, 2015; Klaus and Newton, 2016) . Interestingly, although both Nax and Pradelski (2015) and Newton (2012b) find maxmin selection, these results arise in di↵erent ways. Nax and Pradelski (2015) use logit deviations. Selection then comes from (i) how hard it is for a player to make deviations. Newton (2012b) uses uniform deviations and sampling of opponents' behavior: selection comes from (ii) given an incumbent strategy (a 'convention'), the number of deviations required to induce some player to respond with a di↵erent strategy. In the current study, we have that under logit choice, when deviations are intentional, e↵ect (ii) is dominated by e↵ect (i). Consequently, the long run social norm is the convention at which it is least likely that any player deviates. Under logit choice, this corresponds to the payo↵ of the poorest player being as high as possible -the Egalitarian solution. In contrast, when deviations are unintentional, e↵ects (i) and (ii) combine to create the interesting nonmonotonicities of the Logit bargaining solution.
Our experiments contribute to a small literature that considers non-best response behavior in laboratory data as analagous to deviations in best response dynamics. For two strategy coordination games, when interaction is determined by a network, Mäs and Nax (2016) find deviations to be payo↵ dependent. When interaction is uniform, Lim and Neary (2016) find likewise. Furthermore, the cited studies find that deviations are predominantly made by agents who do relatively badly at the current convention. This points towards deviations being intentional. The current study has more than two strategies and is therefore able to provide more conclusive evidence on this point, as any given agent has several possible deviations that he could make, some of which can be interpreted as intentional and others which cannot. We find that 83% of deviations in our experiments can be interpreted as intentional.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the bargaining solutions and gives the evolutionary model. Section 3 classifies bargaining solutions by the behavioral rules which give rise to them. Section 4 discusses our experimental evidence. Section 5 concludes.
Model

Bargaining solutions
Consider two positions, ↵ and , and a closed, convex bargaining set S ⇢ R 2 containing the origin. The set S gives feasible payo↵s for players in the ↵ and positions respectively. Let the bargaining frontier, the e cient points of S, be given by a strictly decreasing, di↵erentiable, and concave function, f : R ! R, such that (t, f (t)) is the e cient payo↵ pair in which ↵ and players receive t and f (t), respectively. Normalizing the disagreement point to (0, 0), the maximum payo↵ that players ↵ and can obtain arē
. which implies f (s ↵ ) = 0 ands = f (0). A bargaining solution maps bargaining sets to payo↵s. The three bargaining solutions most commonly used in economics are the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) , the Kalai-
Bargaining solution
Notation Definition Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) t Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) , and the Egalitarian bargaining solution (Kalai, 1977) . These solutions uniquely satisfy distinct sets of intuitively appealing properties. The traditional approach is to treat these properties as axiomatic and to find bargaining solutions which have these properties. This is not the approach of the current paper. Rather, we focus on how solutions emerge as long run behavioral norms when agents follow simple behavioral rules when faced with coordination problems. That is, the behavior that gives rise to the solution is treated as axiomatic rather than the properties of the solution itself. Definitions of the bargaining solutions that feature in this paper are given in Table 2 . The Logit bargaining solution, which is new, is analyzed further and compared to existing bargaining solutions in Section 3.1, but for now we move to define the perturbed best response rules that lead to these solutions emerging as norms.
Evolutionary contracting
Consider two populations of agents ↵ and populations of size N . 6 Each period, all agents are matched uniformly at random in heterogeneous pairs of one ↵-agent and one -agent to play a coordination game. The set of possible outcomes on which coordination is possible corresponds to a bargaining frontier as described in Section 2.1. Similarly to previous literature, we discretize the bargaining frontier as follows. Let n 2 N + , = n = n 1s ↵ , and I := {0, 1, 2, · · · , n} and suppose that ↵ and -agents play strategies i ↵ and i from set I. We consider contract games (Young, 1998a) , coordination games in which players who demand the same outcome receive their associated payo↵s, and receive nothing otherwise. 6 Exposition is simplified by the assumption that the populations are of the same size. This is always the case when the two populations represent roles played by di↵erent agents in the same population. That is, each agent could be considered to appear twice: he will play one strategy when he plays as an ↵-player, and another strategy when he plays as a -player. This di↵ers from one population models of coordination games with two types (e.g. Neary, 2012) as there is always an ↵-player and a -player in any matched pair.
That is, the payo↵s for a contract game are
Thus, when an ↵-agent plays i 2 I this can be interpreted as him demanding i , and when a -agent plays i 2 I this can be interpreted as him demanding f (i ). 7 A population state is described by x := (x ↵ , x ), where x ↵ and x are vectors giving the number of agents using each strategy. Thus, the state space ⌅ is
.
More explicitly, we have (
, (x (0), x (1), · · · , x (n))), where x (2), for example, denotes the number of -agents playing strategy 2.
Agents from each population are matched uniformly at random to play the contract game and thus, the expected payo↵ of an ↵ agent who plays strategy i
x (l)/N , given that the fraction of the population using strategy l is x (l)/N. Similarly, the expected payo↵ of a -agent who plays strategy i is ⇡ (i , x) := P l2I ⇡ (i , l) x ↵ (l)/N . Thus, the best response of an ↵-agent to state x is to choose i to maximize ⇡ ↵ (i, i) x (i), and the best response of a -agent is to choose i to maximize ⇡ (i, i) x ↵ (i). We consider the following discrete time strategy updating process. At the beginning of each period, any given agent is independently activated with probability ⌫ 2 (0, 1). Any agent who is not activated will remain playing the same strategy as he did in the previous period. When the current population state is x, an activated agent in population 2 {↵, } will choose a strategy according to the distribution p ⌘ (l|x), l 2 I. This distribution will be such that an activated agent will usually choose a best response to the profile of strategies played by the opposing population. However, from time to time, an agent will make a deviation and play something other than a best response. The parameter ⌘ parameterizes the probability of such deviations, with larger values of ⌘ corresponding to higher deviation probabilities. As ⌘ approaches zero, the probability of any deviation should approach zero at an exponential rate. deviations can be understood as occasional idiosyncratic experimentation, mistakes in play, or as atypical choices arising from random utility shocks. This paper considers processes with perturbations varying in two dimensions: the support of the deviation distribution (unintentional vs. intentional) and the payo↵ dependence or otherwise of deviations within this support (uniform vs. logit).
Uniform mistake rule (see e.g. Young, 1993a; Kandori et al., 1993) .
When deviations are uniform, every deviation occurs with the same probability. That is, from state x, a strategy-revising agent from population 2 {↵, } will choose l with probability
where " = exp( ⌘ 1 ). Note, that as required above, as ⌘ ! 0, the probability of a strategyrevising agent playing anything other than a best response approaches zero.
Logit choice rule (see e.g. Blume, 1993 Blume, , 1996 Alós-Ferrer and Netzer, 2010) . Under the (generalized) logit choice rule, from state x, a strategy-revising agent from population 2 {↵, } will choose strategy l with probability
where q l , l 2 I, are positive constants. Again note that as ⌘ ! 0, the probability of a strategy-revising agent playing anything other than a best response approaches zero.
Intentional & Unintentional deviations (see e.g. Bowles, 2005 Bowles, , 2006 Naidu et al., 2010) .
Let (x) be the set of strategies for an agent of type 2 {↵, } which involve demanding at least as much as the agent demands when best responding to the strategy distribution of the other population.
Unintentional deviation processes retain the probabilities p ⌘ (l|x) described above for logit and uniform deviations. Intentional deviations are when agents never demand less than their best response, but can demand more. This fits with an interpretation of the perturbations as idiosyncratic experimentation by agents to see if they can obtain a higher payo↵. There exists recent experimental evidence which supports such deviations (Lim and Neary, 2016; Mäs and Nax, 2016) . The choice probabilities for intentional processes arê
o t h e r w i s e where p ⌘ (l|x) denotes the choice probability for the corresponding unintentional process. 8
Conventions and long run social norms
The process with ⌘ = 0, or " = 0, is the unperturbed process. The recurrent classes of the unperturbed process are the absorbing states in which all ↵ and -agents coordinate on the same strategy, and each agent type receives nonzero payo↵ (Young, 1998a) . We shall denote by E i , i 2 {0, . . . , n}, the state in which all agents play strategy i, x ↵ (i) = N , x (i) = N . Hence, the absorbing states of the process are precisely those in the set {E 1 , . . . , E n 1 }. Following Young (1993a) , we refer to these states as conventions. Let L := {1, . . . , n 1} index this set, {E i } i2L . We consider the long run behavior of our perturbed processes when deviations are unlikely, that is as ⌘ ! 0. For the current model, each process, uniform or logit, unintentional or intentional, for given ⌘ > 0, has a unique stationary distribution, which we denote µ ⌘ (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A). By standard arguments (see Young, 1998b) , the limit µ := lim ⌘!0 µ ⌘ exists, and for any x 2 ⌅, µ(x) > 0 implies that x is in a recurrent class of the process with ⌘ = 0. In our setting, this implies that x is a convention.
For small deviation probabilities, in the long run, our processes will spend nearly all of the time at or close to stochastically stable states, hence the interpretation of such states as long run social norms. In the next section we link the stochastically stable states of our four processes to our four bargaining solutions.
Characterization
In this section we characterize the stochastically stable conventions. For a fine discretization (small ) and large populations (large N ), the stochastically stable conventions of our four processes correspond to our four bargaining solutions. The results for uniform deviations are known from Young (1998a) and Naidu, Hwang and Bowles (2010) . The results for logit deviations are new.
Theorem 1. For any & > 0, there exists¯ such that for all <¯ , there exists N 2 N such
The reasons for each process giving rise to its corresponding solution can, for the most part, be simply and intuitively explained. For unintentional deviations, any strategy can be played in deviation. From the perspective of a -agent, the most attractive deviation that can be made by ↵-agents is for them to switch to strategy 0, as this opens up the possibility of -agents obtaining their highest payo↵ ofs by coordinating with such an ↵-agent. From a convention E i , i = t, the number of such deviations required to make the best response for a -agent di↵er from i depends on the ratio of the payo↵ from successful coordination on the current convention, f (t), to the highest payo↵s (see expression in Table 3 ). If f (t) is small relative tos , then few deviations by ↵-agents will be required to escape the convention. Reprising this argument, we see that if t is small relative tos ↵ , then few deviations by -agents will be required to escape the convention. For uniform deviations, all possible deviations are equally likely, so the di culty of escaping a convention depends only on the number of deviations required to change the best response. This number is maximized when the payo↵ ratios discussed above are equal: the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
When deviations are intentional, agents who make deviations will always ask for more than they receive at the current convention. From convention E i , i = t, from the perspective of a -agent, the most attractive deviation that can be made by ↵-agents is for them to ask for t+ , just a little bit more than they currently receive. The number of deviations required to change the best response of -agents then depends on the ratio f (t + ) /f(t) (see expression in Table 3 ). This quantity ( f (t + ) /f(t)) and the equivalent quantity for transitions driven by deviations of -agents ( (t ) /t) are respectively increasing and decreasing in t. For uniform deviations, the most robust convention is thus where these quantities are equal: the Nash bargaining solution.
For logit deviations, to find the rareness of transitions the number of deviations must be weighted by the payo↵ losses incurred when the deviations are made. For intentional deviations, as the discretization becomes fine, f (t + ) /f(t) ! 1 for all strictly positive t, so the number of ↵-agents who must make deviations in order to alter the best response of -agents will approach half. Likewise, the number of -agents who must make deviations in order to alter the best response of ↵-agents will also approach half. This means that the payo↵ loss e↵ect dominates and the most robust conventions are those at which deviations Assuming these are ↵-agents and receive t at the current convention... What do they 'demand' when they deviate?
The probability of such deviations decreases exponentially at rate...
The number of deviations required, as a proportion of population size, to induce something other than f (t) as the best response by -agents.
The convention that is hardest to leave can be approximated by... by either population are as rare as possible. This occurs when the payo↵s of ↵ and players are equal: the Egalitarian solution.
For logit-unintentional deviations, the e↵ects linking the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to uniform-unintentional deviations and linking the Egalitarian solution to logit-intentional deviations interact. They do this in a non-trivial way, giving rise to a piecewise solution, sometimes an adjusted Nash bargaining solution, sometimes a form of loss equalization. The logit e↵ect means that deviations are more common when made by relatively poor agents (as defined in the caption to Table 3 ), but the unintentional e↵ect means that fewer deviations by the other population are required to change the best response of relatively poor agents. Importantly, the logit e↵ect dominates here so that the easiest escape paths are driven by the deviations of relatively poor agents, in contrast to the uniform-unintentional case. The Logit bargaining solution is examined in depth in Appendix B. For now, attention is restricted to one part of the solution as we examine the links between behavioral rules and the properties of the associated bargaining solutions.
The properties of the solutions as they relate to behavior
It is shown in Appendix B that the Logit bargaining solution reduces to a piecewise function, taking di↵erent forms dependent upon whethers ↵ is small, medium or large relative tos . Here we focus on the intermediate case, for which the solution is given by
This is an Equal-loss solution (Chun, 1988) which equalizes players' losses with respect to the ideal point (s ,s ↵ ), e↵ectively an Egalitarian solution with a notional disagreement point of (s ,s ↵ ) (see Figure 1 ). The Equal-loss solution typically has an ideal point of (s ↵ ,s ), so that each player's ideal is his own highest possible payo↵. In contrast, (2) gives each player's ideal as the highest possible payo↵ of his opponent. The intuition behind this reversal is explained later in this section. Note that, similarly to previous work that bounds bargaining solutions with respect to one another (see, e.g. Rachmilevitch, 2016 Rachmilevitch, , 2015 Cao, 1982) , when the Logit solution is given by (2), the Egalitarian solution lies between the Logit solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
It follows from (2) that the Logit solution, like the Egalitarian solution, does not scale with linear transformations of payo↵s (the Invariance property - Table 4 ). This arises from logit choice. deviation rates are measured in probability and thus interpersonally comparable. The rate of deviations by any given agent under logit choice depends on his cardinal payo↵ loss from making that deviation. Therefore interpersonal comparability of payo↵s follows from interpersonal comparability of deviation rates. However, interpersonal comparability of payo↵s is precisely what is prohibited under the Invariance property, so the solutions that emerge from logit choice (Logit bargaining solution, Egalitarian solution) do not satisfy Invariance. In contrast, under uniform deviations, choice probabilities are una↵ected by a linear transformation of an agent's payo↵s, so the solutions that emerge (Kalai-Smorodinsky, Nash) satisfy Invariance.
The presence ofs ↵ ands in expression (2) implies that the Logit bargaining solution does not have the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives property (IIA - Table 4 ). This is noteworthy, as under the logit choice rule, the ratios of choice probabilities p ⌘ (l|x) /p ⌘ (l 0 |x) are independent of the payo↵s from any strategyl 6 = l, l 0 . This shows that the IIA property at a micro level (choice behavior) does not translate into an IIA property at a macro level (long run social norm). The dependence of (2) ons ↵ ands , and hence the failure of IIA, arises from the fact that deviations in the underlying behavioral process are unintentional. When deviation behavior is unintentional, the least cost transition paths between conventions involve jumps to extreme states motivated by the prospect of extreme payo↵s (s ↵ ands ), so the solutions that emerge (Kalai-Smorodinsky, Logit bargaining solution) do not satisfy IIA.
In contrast, when deviations are intentional, least cost transition paths are between adjacent conventions and the solutions that emerge (Nash, Egalitarian) satisfy IIA. There does not seem to be a similarly simple way to relate monotonicity properties of solutions to behavioral axioms. We can, however, fit the Logit bargaining solution into the hierarchy of solutions sorted by their monotonicity properties. It turns out that the Logit bargaining solution is the least monotonic of the four solutions. Specifically, we say that a solution is Stretch Monotonic if a stretch of the bargaining frontier parallel to the horizontal axis leads to the player in the ↵ position obtaining a higher payo↵ (Stretch Monotonicity - Table 4 ). This property is implied by Invariance and Individual Monotonicity, and thus satisfied by the Egalitarian, Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solutions. However, we shall see that it is not satisfied by the Logit bargaining solution.
Consider a linear frontier given by f (t) =s ts s↵ . A stretch parallel to the horizontal axis is equivalent to an increase in the value ofs ↵ . Substituting the expression for the frontier into (2), we obtain the solution t L = (2s s↵)s↵ s↵+s . This is decreasing ins ↵ whenevers ↵ ands take similar values. That is, an increase in the best possible payo↵ for the ↵ player leads to his obtaining a lower payo↵ under the Logit bargaining solution. This may seem puzzling at first, but makes sense when we consider that, under logit deviations, the easiest escape path from a convention involves deviations by relatively poor agents. Consider conventions for which t > t L . These are the conventions at which ↵-agents obtain high payo↵s and from which the most likely escape paths involve deviations by -agents. Under unintentional deviations, the number of deviations by -agents required to change the best response of Property Definition
Satisfied by... ↵-agents is lower when the best possible payo↵s ↵ for ↵-agents is higher. That is, ↵-agents su↵er from a high best possible payo↵ as this destabilizes the conventions where ↵-agents do well and pushes the value of t L lower. See Appendix B for a complete illustrated solution for the linear bargaining frontier.
Experimental evidence for intentional and payo↵ dependent deviations
To study human agents' non-best response behavior in a context derived from the model of this paper, we conducted laboratory experiments on human subjects. Five sessions were conducted in English at the experimental laboratory at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. A fixed-role, between-subject design was used. In total, 100 participants, none of whom had any prior experience with this work, were recruited from the university graduate and undergraduate population. All sessions were conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Each session lasted for approximately two hours, and the average amount earned per subject was HKD 132 (USD 17), including the HKD 30 show-up fee. The maximum payment was HKD 210 and the minimum payment was HKD 57. The standard deviation was 57.
Each session involved ↵ and populations of subjects (representing the agents in the model of Section 2) of size N = 10 playing for 200 periods. Each period, every subject, independently with probability ⌫ (= 0.9 in Sessions 1, 2, 3; = 0.5 in Sessions 4, 5), was activated and got the opportunity to update his strategy. The information displayed to a subject was:
(i) His own payo↵ when playing any given strategy and matched to a member of the other population also playing that strategy.
(ii) For periods ⌧ 2, the number of subjects in the other population who played each strategy in the preceding period.
(iii) The strategy played and the payo↵ obtained by the subject in the preceding period.
(iv) Whether or not the subject has the opportunity to update his strategy in the current period.
Note that subjects were given no information about the coordination payo↵s of subjects in the other population and the laboratory was set up to ensure that no subjects would gain any such information during the session. This absence of information about others' coordination payo↵s is similar to Mäs and Nax (2016) . 9 This lack of information about the payo↵s of subjects in the other population is motivated by our interest in the emergence of conventions (i.e. convergence to E 1 , E 2 or E 3 ) as predicted by the theory. If such information were provided, it could be used to coordinate on a pre-existing norm from outside of the laboratory. For more on this, see the end of this section. Subjects given the opportunity to change their strategy could choose any of strategies 1 to 5, which were labeled as A to E, the order of the labeling and the order of presentation of the strategies di↵ering across sessions. If they were activated and failed to choose a strategy within a specified period, they remained playing the same strategy as in the previous period. Following strategy updating, ↵-subjects were paired with -subjects and obtained payo↵s corresponding to their chosen strategies played against one another in the game in Figure 2 (depicted as points on a bargaining frontier in Figure 3 ). The instructions given to subjects and images of the decision making interface are given in Appendix C.
In every session, best responses constituted a large majority (> 90%) of choices by the subjects and play converged to a convention. Analysis of non-best response play reveals that subjects rarely update to strategies that correspond to payo↵s lower than the payo↵ associated with their best response strategy (see Figure 4 ). In every session-population pair except one (Session 5, ↵-subjects, with only 6 data points) deviations which can be interpreted as intentional outnumber deviations which cannot be so interpreted. In total, 844 out of 1012 deviations (> 83%) can be interpreted as intentional. Methodologically, as the game has five strategies, rather than two as in recent similar studies (Lim and Neary, 2016; Mäs and Nax, 2016) , for any given subject with a given best response there exist multiple non-best response strategies, and so we were able to classify observed deviations Table 5 : For given player position and best response strategy, aggregate rate of non-best response play and proportion of non-best responses that can be interpreted as intentional. An asterisk (*) indicates that a value di↵ers significantly (p < 0.001) from the expected proportion that would obtain if all non-best responses were equally likely. Note that there were only 29 updating opportunities and 13 non-best responses when the best response was strategy 1 or strategy 5, hence these columns are omitted from the table.
as intentional or not on an individual basis. 10 Aggregating over subjects' best response strategies at observed states, we find that in four out of the six population-best response pairs for which we have enough data, the proportion of deviations that can be interpreted as intentional di↵ers significantly (statistically, with p < 0.001) from that which we would expect to obtain if every non-best response strategy were equally likely (see Table 5 ). In summary, there is clear support for some level of intentional behavior in non-best response play. Furthermore, we observe higher rates of non-best response play from subjects for whom the expected payo↵ from the best response strategy is lower ( Figure 5 ). That is, there is support for payo↵ dependence in non-best response play. From the Figure, it can be seen that this is true across both ↵ and populations and holds regardless of whether deviations can be interpreted as intentional. Note that although the charts appear similar, the vertical axis of the unintentional chart has a scale of half that of the the other charts, reflecting the relative number of deviations of each type as discussed in the preceding paragraph. Further support for payo↵ dependence is found in Appendix D, where we conduct a logistic regression on payo↵ di↵erences that accounts for the possibility of decreasing deviation rates as a function of time.
An important aspect of our design is that ↵-subjects do not know the coordination pay-o↵s of -subjects and vice versa. This brings two benefits. Firstly, the potential impact of other-regarding preferences is minimized, as any beliefs about the payo↵s of the opposing population would have to be inferred from behavior. Secondly, and we believe more importantly, subjects' strategy choice cannot be influenced by pre-existing social norms. If subjects could observe the full payo↵ structure of the game, then a pre-existing norm such as the Kalai-Smorodinsky, Nash, Egalitarian or Logit solutions could encourage subjects to play i = 2, 3, 1, 2 respectively. The outcome of the sessions suggests that subjects did not infer any correspondence between a pre-existing norm and the payo↵ structure of the game, as of the five sessions, three converged to convention E 3 (Nash), while one converged to E 2 (Kalai-Smorodinsky, Logit) and one to E 1 (Egalitarian).
The observed short run convergence to some convention is predicted by the theoretical processes considered earlier in the paper. Note though that nothing can be inferred about long run norms from observing the conventions that were reached. For such an analysis, we would require observations over a longer timescale than is feasible within the constraints of the laboratory. 11 However, Theorem 1 can be used to comment on long run norms by extrapolating from the characteristics of observed non-best response behavior. Our observa-tions suggest that non-best response play is intentional and payo↵ dependent. Therefore, the theory suggests that, of the four solutions considered in this paper, the Egalitarian solution is the most likely candidate for a long run social norm.
As noted earlier in this section, information about the payo↵s of subjects in the other population could potentially facilitate the application of pre-existing norms that evolved outside of the laboratory. This seems to be what was observed in pilot sessions that were carried out prior to a decision on a final design. In these sessions, opponents' payo↵s were observable. There were three of these sessions, two which used the same payo↵s as are used here, and a third which used di↵erent payo↵s. 12 In all of these sessions, there was convergence within a few periods to the convention corresponding to the Egalitarian solution. This provides some slight further support for egalitarianism, but too much should not be read into this, as each of these sessions can be understood as a single data point.
We note that implications of the experimental results of the paper apply specifically to the class of games, the experimental environment and context that we consider. Rates of best response behavior and the type of non-best response behavior observed may di↵er for other classes of games or other experimental environments. This is, in itself, an important research topic.
Conclusion
What has been presented here is a theory of the emergence of bargaining solutions as social norms that rests on behavior and not on the properties of the solutions themselves. Societal interactions take individual behavior as an input and give a social norm, or to put it another way, a social choice, as output. Thus, if we think of a society as similar to an organism with agency, we can regard the traditional, normative approaches to social choice as specifying behavioral rules for society itself, rather than for the individuals within society. As such, the results of the current paper and the rest of the Evolutionary Nash Program can be understood as a reconciliation of micro and macro behavioral theories: the presence of well developed norms in a group should help members of the group to face new problems, take decisions and adjust their behavior as if they were of one mind. Conversely, in recent years there has been considerable work on the e↵ect of collective agency at a small group level on social norms (see Newton, 2018 , Section 2, for a survey). The modeling of two way influence between norms and agency is an interesting avenue for future research.
Appendix A. Proofs
Denote by P ⌘ (x, y) the transition probability from state x to state y. Define the resistance of such a transition, V (x, y), as
where V is defined over the set of all x, y 2 ⌅ such that P⌘(x, y) > 0 for some⌘ > 0 (see Beggs, 2005; Sandholm, 2010) . For uniform deviations, V (x, y) equals the number of agents who switch to anything other than a best response.
For the logit choice rule, V (x, y) equals the best response payo↵ minus the payo↵ from the chosen strategy, summed over all updating agents.
Lemma 1. Each process, uniform or logit, unintentional or intentional, for given ⌘ > 0, has a unique stationary distribution, which we denote µ ⌘ .
Proof. Note that for all x 2 ⌅, n 2 ↵ (x), so for all of our processes, from any x 2 ⌅, we have that P ⌘ (x, y) > 0 for some y such that y ↵ (n) = N . From y, n is a best response for any -agent, so P ⌘ (y, E n ) > 0. Therefore, from any x 2 ⌅, with positive probability E n will be reached within two periods. As the state space is finite, standard results in Markov chain theory 13 imply that for all ⌘ > 0, P ⌘ has a unique recurrent class and µ ⌘ exists and is unique.
In a similar way that V (·, ·) measures the rarity of single steps in the process, we will use a concept, overall cost, that measures the rarity of a transition between any two states over any number of periods. Let P(x, x 0 ) be the set of finite sequences of states {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x T } such that x 1 = x, x T = x 0 and for some⌘ > 0, P⌘(x ⌧ , x ⌧ +1 ) > 0, ⌧ = 1, . . . , T 1.
Definition 2. The overall cost of a transition between x, x 0 2 ⌅ is:
If there is no positive probability path between x and x 0 then let c(x, x 0 ) = 1. We shall be interested in the cost of transitions between conventions. In the current setting, this quantity is always finite. Denote the overall cost functions for the uniform-unintentional, logit-unintentional, uniform-intentional and logit-intentional processes by c U , c L , c UI , c LI respectively.
Then, to calculate min
As V (., .) 0, we can, without loss of generality, assume that x t / 2 F i for t < T. For t = 1 . . . , T 1, for all 2 {↵, }, define
That is, {y 1 , . . . , y T } di↵ers from {x 1 , . . . , x T } only in that all transitions to any j 2 I at t + 1 are now by agents who played i at t.
Let t 0 be the smallest t such that
x t+1 ), contradicting (A.5). So t 0 = T and for all t < T , we have y t / 2 F i and
Now, if P y t+1 (i) < P y t (i) 1, then take some j, such that y t+1 (j) > y t (j) and define y t+ to be identical to y t except that y t+ (i) = y t (i) 1 and y t+ (j) = y t (j) + 1. Then, by (A.2) or (A.3) we have
Now replace {y 1 , . . . , y t , y t+1 , . . . , y T } with {y 1 , . . . , y t , y t+ , y t+1 , . . . , y T } and iterate this procedure until we obtain {z 1 , . . . , z T 0 } such that z 1 = y 1 , z T 0 = y T , and either z t+1 = z t or P z t+1 (i) = P z t (i) 1 for t = 1, . . . , T 0 1. If z t+1 = z t , then V (z t , z t+1 ) = 0, so we omit such transitions and renumber our sequence {z 1 , . . . , zT }, which now satisfies the conditions in the statement of the lemma. Now,
which completes the proof.
Lemma 3. For i 2 L,
where a ⇡ b denotes |a b|  max{s ↵ ,s }.
Proof. Let ⇠ i be the lowest number of deviations by a -agent, 2 {↵, }, on any transition path from E i , i 2 L, to some E j , j 2 I, j 6 = i. At some point on any such path, some j 6 = i must become a best response. Therefore,
where C i = I for unintentional processes and C i = (E i ) \ {i} for intentional processes. It follows that ⇠ ↵ i is attained when ↵-agents make deviations and play k 2 arg max j2C ↵ i ⇡ (j, j), and ⇠ i is attained when -agents make deviations and play k 2 arg max j2C i ⇡ ↵ (j, j). (A.13) and for intentional processes
For uniform deviations, each deviation adds 1 to the cost of the transition, therefore the least cost transition from E i , i 2 L, to some E j , j 2 I, j 6 = i, is one involving the fewest deviations. The cost of such a transition is then min{⇠ ↵ i , ⇠ i }, which by (A.12) and (A.13), equals the RHS of (A.8) for unintentional deviations, and by (A.12) and (A.14), equals the RHS of (A.10) for intentional deviations.
For logit deviations, as each deviation is weighted by the expected payo↵ loss, the lowest cost from the transitions involving the fewest deviations is min{⇡
There may exist lower cost transitions, but as Lemma 2 tells us we can restrict attention to paths in which one agent switches at a time, we can invoke Theorem 1 of Hwang and Newton (2017) and, for intentional processes, Theorem 1 from Hwang and Newton (2014) , to give min j6 =i
so we have the RHS of (A.9) and (A.11). Finally, note that for unintentional deviations, by (A.13), lowest cost transitions out of E i involve extreme deviations in which either ↵-agents switch to 0 until 0 is a best response for -agents, or -agents switch to n until n is a best response for ↵-agents. Consider ↵-agents making deviations until 0 is a best response for -agents. It is then possible that all -agents update their strategy to 0, to reach a state x such that x (0) = N . From such a state, any strategy is a best response for ↵-agents, so it is possible that they all choose some arbitrary strategy k, following which k becomes a best response for -agents who can in turn switch to k so that E k is reached. We see that any least cost exit path from E i can reach E k for arbitrary k without further mistakes. That is, c(E i , E k ) = min j6 =i c(E i , E j ) for all k 6 = i. The next step is to characterize the stochastically stable states of our model for given and large population size.
Lemma 4. For c 2 {c UI , c LI } and corresponding 2 { UI , LI }, let i 2 arg max j2L ' (j ). Then
Proof. We can write (t) = min{a(t), b(t)}. As a(t) is increasing in t, b(t) is decreasing in
If a(i ) > b(i ), a similar argument implies the same conclusion. To conclude, note that by the proof of Lemma 3,
Definition 4. An i-graph is a directed graph on L such that every vertex except for i has exactly one exiting edge and the graph has no cycles. Let G(i) denote the set of i-graphs. For a graph g, let (j ! k) 2 g denote an edge from j to k in g. Define stochastic potential:
We know from Freidlin and Wentzell (1984, chap.6) , Young (1993a) that:
Proof. Let l / 2 arg max j2L ' (j ) and let i 2 arg max j2L ' (j ). Consider g 2 G(i). For
. For c = c UI , c LI , this follows from the proof of Lemma 3, i 2 arg max j2L ' (j ), and the fact that one term inside the minimization defining the corresponding ' (t) is increasing t, the other term decreasing in t. Thus (j ! k) 2 g implies that lim By (A.15) , this shows that for large enough N , if l 2 L does not maximize ' (· ) then µ(E l ) = 0. So µ(E i ) > 0 must imply that i 2 arg max j2L ' (j ). This characterizes the stochastically stable states for large N . The principle theorem of the paper approximates these states for small , linking them to bargaining solutions. To prove the Theorem we use the following lemma. Lemma 6. Suppose ' is a continuous function which admits a unique maximum. Suppose ' such that ' converges uniformly to ' as ! 0. Let t ⇤ 2 arg max '(t) and
i ⇤ 2 arg max i ' (i ). Then for all & > 0, there exists¯ > 0 such that for all <¯ , we have |i ⇤ t ⇤ | < &.
Proof. By the definitions of t ⇤ 2 arg max t '(t) and i ⇤ 2 arg max i ' (i ), we have '(t ⇤ ) '(i ⇤ ) and ' (i ⇤ ) ' (t). Let & > 0. By uniform convergence we can choose <¯ , such
Thus we have that
For all& > 0, there exists¯ such that for all <¯ , we have |'(t ⇤ ) '(i ⇤ )| <&. (A.16) Without loss of generality we suppose that i ⇤ < t ⇤ and let & > 0 be given. Then for & > 0 we can choose⇢ such that for all ⇢ <⇢
where ' 1 is the inverse function for ' defined in a neighborhood of t ⇤ except t ⇤ . Taking the limit of ' U (t) and ' L (t) as ! 0 gives uniform convergence to
respectively. These functions are maximized at t KS , t L , respectively. Lemmas 5 and 6 then complete the proof for the cases of uniform-unintentional and logit-unintentional deviations. For the case of logit-intentional deviations, ' LI (t) takes the form min{a(t), b(t)}, with
. Continuity of f (·) implies that there exist & > 0,ˆ > 0 such that for all <ˆ , a(t) < b(t) for all  t < &, and a(t) > b(t) for alls ↵ t >s ↵ &. Therefore, the following function equals ' LI (t) at all t = i, i = 1, . . . , n 1.
As ! 0,' LI converges uniformly tô 
Appendix C. Experiments -instructions and interface
Appendix C.1. Decision screen faced by subjects Here we give the decision screen faced by subjects from the second round onwards. Position 1 corresponds to the population of ↵-subjects and Position 2 corresponds to the population of -subjects. Subjects were informed of their own payo↵s from successful coordination and the proportions of subjects in the other position who played each strategy in the preceding round. 
Appendix C.2. Instructions given to participants INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome to the study. In the following two hours, you will participate in 200 rounds of strategic decision making. Please read these instructions carefully; the cash payment you will receive at the end of the study depends on how well you perform so it is important that you understand the instructions. If you have a question at any point, please raise your hand and wait for one of us to come over. We ask that you turn o↵ your mobile phone and any other electronic devices. Communication of any kind with other participants is not allowed.
Your Cash Payment
For each participant, the experimenter randomly and independently selects 3 rounds to calculate the cash payment. (So it is in your best interest to take each round seriously.) Each round has an equal chance to be selected as a payment round for you. You will not be told which rounds are chosen to be the payment rounds for you until the end of the session. Your total cash payment at the end of the experiment will be the average earnings in the three selected rounds (translated into HKD as the exchange rate of 1 Token = 1 HKD) plus a 30 HKD show-up fee.
Your total cash payment = HK (The average of earnings in the 3 selected rounds) + HK 30
Your Role and Decision Group
You are one of 20 participants in today's session. At the beginning of the experiment, one half of the participants will be randomly assigned to be in Position 1 and the other half to be in Position 2. Your position will remain fixed throughout the experiment. In each round, all individuals are randomly paired so that each pair comprises one Position 1 player and one Position 2 player. Thus, in a round you will have an equal, 1 in 10 chance of being paired with any given participant in the other position. You will not be told the identity of the participant you are paired with in any round, nor will that participant be told your identity-even after the end of the experiment. Participants will be randomly re-paired after each round to form new pairs.
Your Decision in Each Round
In each round, you will play a 2-player game with the participant you are paired with. For each player, there are five available actions, labeled A, B, C, D, and E. You and the participant you are paired with simultaneously choose an action, and only if the choices made by you and the other participant are the same, may you be able to get a positive earning in the round. You are prompted to choose an action by clicking one of the five buttons A, B, C, D, and E at the bottom of your screen. Your decision in the round is completed.
Do You Know Your Payo↵s?
At the beginning of the first round, you will be assigned to a position. Then the payo↵ values, a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , d 1 , and e 1 , are revealed to the position 1 players and the payo↵ values, a 2 , b 2 , c 2 , d 2 , and e 2 , are revealed to the position 2 players. However, you will not be told the payo↵ values for the players in the other position, even after the end of the experiment.
An Opportunity to Change Your Action
In the first round, every participant is given the opportunity to choose an action out of the five available ones. In any round from the second round, the opportunity to change an action is given to each participant independently with 90% chance only. That is, with 10% chance, any given participant is not allowed to change his/her action. In case that the opportunity to change your action is not given, you will see the following message in your decision screen:
"In this round, you are not given the opportunity to change your action choice." and will be assigned the same action as in the previous round. You will not be told whether the opportunity to change an action is given to the participant you are paired with, nor will the participant you are paired with be told whether such an opportunity is given to you.
Information Feedback
In each round, at the right-bottom corner of your screen, you will see the summary of the previous round. First, you will see your action choice and your earning from the previous round. Second, you will see the bar chart that reports how many people among the 10 participants in the other position chose each action in the previous round.
Rundown of the Study
1. At the beginning of the first round, you will be assigned to a position, and you will be shown the payo↵ values for yourself. In the main panel of your decision screen, you will be prompted to enter your choice of action. You must choose one of five actions A, B, C, D, and E within 30 seconds. If you do not choose an action, one action will be randomly assigned to you.
3. You will be prompted to enter your choice of action for the second round, if you have the opportunity to change your action. The game does not change, so as before you must choose one of five actions.
All future rounds are identical to the first round except for two important di↵erence.
(a) The first di↵erence concerns how much time you have to choose an action. In rounds 2 10, you have 20 seconds to make a decision. If you do not make a decision within the 20 second window, then you will be assigned whatever action you used in the previous round. For rounds 11 200, you have only 10 seconds in which to make a decision. Again, if you fail to choose an action in this timeframe, you will be assigned the same action as in the previous round.
(b) The second di↵erence concerns whether the opportunity to change your action is given with 100% chance (round 1) or with 90% chance (rounds 2 200).
Administration
Your decisions as well as your cash payment will be kept completely confidential. Remember that you have to make your decisions entirely on your own; do not discuss your decisions with any other participants.
Upon completion of the study, you will receive your cash payment. You will be asked to sign your name to acknowledge your receipt of the payment. You are then free to leave.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now. We will answer questions individually. If there are no questions, we will begin with the study. Best response payoff Figure D .9: Rates of non-best response play grouped by expected payo↵ from the best response strategy for periods 51 to 180. Data are grouped into bins by best response payo↵ (0 to 10, 10 to 20, etc.). The area of each circle on the chart is proportional to the square root of the number of strategy updating opportunities it represents.
Appendix D.2. Regression
Letting i denote an individual subject, for periods t = 2, . . . , 200, let ⇡ BR it be the expected payo↵ to subject i from playing a best response to the strategy profile played in period t 1. Similarly, let ⇡ NBR it be the highest expected payo↵ from any strategy that is not a best response. Using expression (1), it can be shown that, for small values of ⌘, the probability of a deviation at period t by player i under the logit choice rule is approximately proportional to exp( ⌘ 1 (⇡ BR it ⇡ NBR it )). Define the binary variable M it as follows. M it = 1 if subject i in period t does not play a best response to the strategies played in period t 1, and M it = 0 otherwise. A multinomial logit regression with individual fixed e↵ects was carried out with dependent variable M it and independent variables ⇡ BR it ⇡ NBR it and t, the latter to account for a possible change in deviation rates due to the passage of time. We label the coe cients of these variables 1 , 2 respectively.
The sign of each coe cient is easy to interpret. If deviations are less frequent when more payo↵ is lost as a consequence, then 1 should be negative. If subjects deviate less as a session progresses, then 2 should be negative. Table D .7 presents the results. From Column (1), we see that 1 is negative and significant at the 1% level across all sessions. Column (2) shows that across all sessions, subjects deviate less often as time proceeds. Estimated marginal e↵ects can be determined as follows. The coe cient 0.0040936 in Session 1 indicates that, holding t fixed, a one unit decrease in ⇡ BR ⇡ NBR leads to an increase in the probability of a deviation by a factor of exp(0.0040936) = 1.004102.
(1) 
